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Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation
of Hearsay Evidence
Peter Miene,* Roger C. Park,**
and Eugene Borgida***
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that your favorite bank teller observes a bank rob-
bery, witnesses the robber, and a few hours later tells a police
investigator everything that happened. At trial, in the absence
of exceptional circumstances, the police investigator may not be
allowed to testify about the events described by the teller. The
hearsay rule normally would exclude the evidence, even if the
teller was unavailable at the time of the trial. Hearsay is evi-
dence that is introduced into court by one person (the witness)
based on what another person (the declarant) has said outside
of court.' A simple repetition of a statement is not necessarily
hearsay. In order for testimony to be considered hearsay, "the
repeated statement must be offered for the purpose of proving
that what the declarant said is true-just as if the declarant
were on the witness stand, giving testimony that the proponent
wants the trier to believe." 2
Thus, some out-of-court statements are not hearsay be-
cause the witness does not offer the statement to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. For example, a declarant's state-
ment, "If you don't help me, I'll kill you," offered by the propo-
nent to show that the hearer was under duress, would not be
hearsay.3 It does not matter whether the declarant was telling
the truth or not; the hearer might still fear death. Most policy
* Doctoral candidate in social psychology, University of Minnesota.
** Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
*** Professor of Psychology, Adjunct Professor of Law and Political Sci-
ence, University of Minnesota.
1. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c). For a general discussion of hearsay, see Mc-
CORMCK ON EVIDENCE §§ 244-327 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) [herein-
after McCoRMICK].
2. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTON TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 6.1,
at 180 (2d ed. 1987).
3. See McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 249, at 733-34.
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reasons for excluding hearsay do not apply because the declar-
ant need not be cross-examined under oath.
An out-of-court hearsay statement is not always excluded
from evidence. The statement may fit into one of the dozens of
exceptions to the hearsay rule.4 For example, courts routinely
admit hospital records into evidence for the truth of what they
assert under the business records exception to the hearsay
rule.5 The hearsay exceptions themselves have exceptions and
qualifications, and the law of hearsay is a complicated web of
doctrine.6
Despite the many exceptions to the hearsay rule, some evi-
dence is clearly inadmissible hearsay. Suppose, for example,
that in a criminal case in lieu of a police officer's courtroom tes-
timony the prosecution offered the written report of the officer
who observed a crime. Or suppose that in a civil suit to recover
damages for personal injuries caused by an accident, one party
offers an investigator's testimony that a day after the accident,
she interviewed a bystander who saw the accident, and the by-
stander said that one of the cars crossed the center line. When
offered to prove the truth of their assertions, the police report
and the bystander's statement would almost surely be excluded
on hearsay grounds.7
The difference between hearsay testimony and eyewitness
testimony is significant, as reflected by the research presented
in this Article. In eyewitness testimony, the witness testifies
about information with which he or she has had direct experi-
ence. This testimony is subject to direct and cross-examination.
Under cross-examination, the adversary reveals weaknesses
and contradictions in the testimony. Presumably, the jury re-
sponds to this information accordingly. Our adversarial system
of justice relies on the power of cross-examination to reveal in-
accuracies or inconsistencies in testimony.8 With hearsay testi-
mony, however, the opposing party cannot utilize the powerful
technique of cross-examining the witness, and especially the
out-of-court declarant. The opposing attorney can do little but
question the witness's ability to recall what the declarant said
4. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 803, 804.
5. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 313, at 882-85.
6. Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 51, 55 (1987).
7. See McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 248, at 731-32.
8. JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CAsEs
AND MATERIALs (1985).
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and to highlight the fact that this testimony is not based on di-
rect experience.
In general, scholars adopt one of two competing views re-
garding the proper treatment of hearsay admissibility. One po-
sition results from a view that cross-examination of a hearsay
witness cannot reveal anything about the credibility of the out-
of-court declarant.9 The testimony may therefore be unduly
prejudicial.'0 Some legal scholars adopting this position cite the
possibility that errors can easily occur even when one person
recalls information said by another, such as if the hearsay wit-
ness did not correctly hear what the declarant said. 1 For these
reasons, legal scholars adopting this position do not favor the
admissibility of hearsay evidence.
Supporters of the opposing view take the position that
"hearsay can be convincing evidence, and it is the sort of evi-
dence on which we routinely rely in the most important affairs
of home, state, and business."' 2 Proponents of this position ar-
gue, then, that everyday experiences make people aware of po-
tential problems with hearsay and that people can accurately
process this type of information. 13 Thus, they argue, hearsay
evidence should not be withheld from a jury because jurors can
give this testimony an appropriate evaluation in reaching their
verdicts.
The question of hearsay admissibility thus revolves primar-
ily around the issue of whether it is more just to withhold from
the jury information that is perhaps unreliable and difficult to
assess, or to provide the jury with all available information,
trusting that jurors will use the information appropriately. Re-
search on the processes of human inference suggests that peo-
ple are not always sensitive to factors that may underlie the
9. McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 245, at 728.
10. See, e.g., LILLY, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 182; 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1362, at 3 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed.
1974).
11. See, e.g., Report of Committee on Administration of Justice on Model
Code of Evidence, 19 J. ST. B. CAL. 262, 274 (1944).
12. See Park, supra note 6, at 54.
13. The legal definition and the lay concept of "hearsay" differ. First, the
legal term "hearsay" is not a synonym for rumor or gossip. A statement from
a reliable source with first-hand information may still be hearsay. For exam-
ple, an out-of-court statement from a trained observer who saw an accident
would be hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Second,
the term "hearsay" is not restricted to oral statements, that is, statements that
one "hears" someone else "say." A writtern assertion, offered to prove its
truth, is also hearsay. See FED. R. EVED. 801(a); McCoRMICK, supra note 1,
§ 248, at 732.
1992]
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reliability of evidence used in everyday life.14 Hearsay evidence
might unduly persuade the social perceiver: social perceivers
may be viewed as impressionable and often irrational decision
makers prone to overweighing anecdotal evidence and emotion-
ally compelling accounts based on small samples. If jurors in-
deed more readily recall hearsay evidence they may overvalue
the hearsay while preparing a verdict. 15 In contrast, cautions
and instructions from the judge, coupled with cross-examina-
tion pointing out the potential flaws of hearsay evidence, may
prompt jurors to be cautious in their interpretation and evalua-
tion of hearsay.16 This testimony would then have very little
impact on the verdict. Only a few studies, however, have em-
pirically examined these issues and the next section discusses
these studies.
I. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF HEARSAY
A study by Stephan Landsman and Richard Rakos repre-
sents one of the first attempts to assess the impact of hearsay
evidence on decision making.17 By experimentally manipulat-
ing the strength of hearsay testimony and the overall strength
of the case against the defendant in a factorial research design,
Landsman and Rakos designed their study to gauge the condi-
tions under which hearsay would be relied upon by mock ju-
rors. They aimed to examine the overall impact of hearsay on
decision making by creating some situations in which the hear-
say was stronger than the other evidence and other situations
in which the hearsay was weaker than the other evidence. Be-
cause their interest centered on the impact of the hearsay evi-
dence, the authors chose levels of hearsay evidence that varied
both in the content of the testimony and in the credibility of
14. See SUSAN T. FiSKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 66-95
(2d ed. 1991); THOMAS GiLOviCH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLI_-
BILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 88-111 (1991); RICHARD NISBETr
& LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT 3, 7-8 (1980).
15. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of the Memory Factor in
Analyzing the Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson Slowly Learnt-
and Quickly Forgotten, 41 FLA. L. REV. 215, 222-28 (1989); I. Daniel Stewart,
Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 1, 8-22.
16. J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions,
69 NEB. L. REV. 71, 79-87 (1990).
17. Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay: A Prelimi-
nary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the Prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in
American Courts, 15 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 65 (1991).
[Vol. 76:683
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the hearsay witness. They deemed the methodological con-
founding of these variables necessary to create levels of hearsay
that varied widely along a dimension of evidentiary strength.
To examine how mock jurors utilize hearsay evidence in
decision making, Landsman and Rakos randomly assigned 147
participants to one of the twelve conditions created by the four
levels of hearsay and the three levels of other evidence
strength. Participants read a twelve-page transcript of a trial
concerning a defendant charged with stealing money from a
coat in a restaurant. The transcripts contained opening state-
ments and closing arguments by the attorneys, an introduction
and final instructions from the judge, and a large number of ev-
identiary statements made by several witnesses. Study partici-
pants read the trial transcript and then provided a verdict and
other evaluations.
The results indicated that even though jurors rated the two
strongest levels of hearsay as more important to their verdict
than the two weakest levels of hearsay, the strength of the
hearsay evidence had no impact whatsoever on the verdict.
The researchers designed the hearsay evidence' 8 to incriminate
the defendant and thus expected strong hearsay to produce
more guilty verdicts than weak hearsay. However, sixty-seven
percent of the mock jurors receiving the "weak" hearsay found
the defendant guilty while only fifty-eight percent of the jurors
receiving the "strong" hearsay voted for conviction. These con-
viction rates compare to a fifty-one percent rate for mock ju-
rors who received no hearsay evidence. Thus, the strength of
the hearsay evidence had no systematic effect on mock jurors'
verdicts, nor did strength of hearsay interact with the strength
of the other evidence.
An experimental study by Margaret Bull Kovera, Steven
Penrod, and Roger Park examined different strengths of eye-
witnesses and hearsay witnesses. 19 The eyewitnesses provided
accounts that were classified as good, moderate, or poor in
terms of accuracy. Each hearsay witness watched a videotape
of one of these accounts and then described the information af-
ter an interval of either one day or one week. Researchers ex-
posed mock jurors to a variety of eyewitness and hearsay
accounts. Kovera, Penrod, and Park found that hearsay wit-
18. 1d. at 72-73. The researchers did not label the evidence as hearsay for
the mock jurors. I
19. Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors'Perceptions of Hearsay Evidence,
76 MINN. L. REv. 703 (1992).
1992]
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nesses testifying after the short delay were far more accurate
than those witnesses testifying after the long delay. The mock
jurors rated the quality and the usefulness of the hearsay testi-
mony after the short delay significantly higher than the long
delay testimony. However, mock jurors rated the eyewitness
testimony as more useful and of higher quality than the hear-
say testimony. Thus, the results provided support for a skepti-
cism effect.
II. DO JURORS USE HEARSAY EVIDENCE?
In our research on hearsay evidence, we hypothesized that
mock jurors would differentiate between evidence from an eye-
witness and a hearsay witness.20 More specifically, we expected
that jurors would discount hearsay testimony or would consider
eyewitness testimony conveying the same information to be
more significant. Previous research on the effects of eyewitness
testimony suggests that it is influential in juror decision mak-
ing.21 These eyewitness studies support the argument that peo-
ple intuitively accord considerable information value to
eyewitness information even when various factors should un-
dermine the accuracy of the eyewitness identifications. Studies
on the influence of expert testimony in cases involving eyewit-
ness testimony, for example, suggest that corrective testimony
from an expert that sensitizes jurors to the fallibility of eyewit-
ness testimony is effective at weakening the influence of eye-
witness testimony.22 Thus, in a situation where a party
presents no expert testimony, we expected that an eyewitness,
as compared with a hearsay witness, would more strongly influ-
ence jurors.
In order to test these hypotheses about hearsay evaluation,
we created a trial stimulus tape based on an apparently real
theft. A few participants, recruited ostensibly to evaluate law
students in a mock trial, witnessed an experimental confeder-
20. See Peter Miene et al., The Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, Paper
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association
(Aug. 1990), in CURRENT IssuEs IN INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP DECISION MAKING
RESEARCH (N. John Castellan, Jr. ed., forthcoming 1992).
21. See EYEWrrNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Gary L.
Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984); Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Decision
Making in Eyewitness Ident~ifation Cases, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 52-54
(1988); Saul M. Kassin et al., The "General Acceptance" of Psychological Re-
search on Eyewitness Testimony, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1089, 1095 (1989).
22. See Brian L. Cutler et al., The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologis and
the Jury, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 311, 326-29 (1989).
[Vol. 76:683
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ate enter the University of Minnesota Law School and leave a
short time later carrying a computer. A law professor then led
these participants to believe that a person had just stolen his
computer and that they were eyewitnesses to the theft. We
prevented another group of participants from witnessing the
theft. They became hearsay witnesses through a procedure in
which we individually paired them with one of the eyewit-
nesses during mock police questioning about the theft. Thus,
the staged theft created actual eyewitnesses and hearsay wit-
nesses to a seemingly real event. We conducted and videotaped
a mock trial involving these witnesses, the confederate defend-
ant, two attorneys, and a district court judge.
We created four different experimental conditions from
this videotape: circumstantial evidence only, circumstantial evi-
dence plus hearsay testimony, circumstantial evidence plus eye-
witness testimony, and circumstantial evidence plus eyewitness
and hearsay testimony. All groups received standard Minne-
sota judicial instructions and appropriate opening statements
and closing arguments by the two attorneys. The two groups
receiving hearsay testimony also heard the standard Minnesota
hearsay caution as part of the judge's instructions to the jury,
but the hearsay testimony was not labeled as such, nor did the
attorneys object to the evidence when it was presented.P It
should be noted that the hearsay evidence used in this study
23. The cautionary instructions for hearsay evidence presented to jurors
midway through judicial instructions were as follows:
There has been testimony in this case about statements made out
of court by a person who did not testify on the witness stand. For ex-
ample, you heard testimony about statements that were made out of
court describing the events in the law school corridors on the day in
question, and describing the person who was carrying something from
the law school.
This type of testimony is known as hearsay evidence. Hearsay evi-
dence is evidence of an out-of-court statement offered to prove the
truth of something that was said in the statement.
Hearsay evidence must be viewed with caution because it depends
for its value upon the credibility of someone who did not testify in
court. Courtroom witnesses are under oath and they can be cross-ex-
amined about what they observed. A person who makes an out-of-
court statement is not under oath. When the out-of-court statement is
received in evidence, there is no opportunity to cross-examine the per-
son who made the out-of-court statement or to observe how that per-
son responds to questions.
Hearsay evidence is often unreliable, and you must use caution in
evaluating it. However, you are the sole judges of whether it should
be believed and of the weight to be given to it. As with the evaluation
of other evidence, you should in the last analysis rely upon your own
experience, good judgment, and common sense.
1992]
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would not be admissible in an actual trial, as an exception to
the hearsay rule does not cover this testimony. The circum-
stantial evidence came from two witnesses played by actors.
One actor played the role of the law professor reporting the
stolen computer. A second actor played the role of the defend-
ant's landlord, who testified that he found the computer in the
defendant's apartment. The attorneys working on the project
with us created the circumstantial evidence and designed it to
provide context for the eyewitness or hearsay witness testi-
mony. They believed that the circumstantial evidence alone
would not produce a verdict of guilty.
We showed the four videotapes to 186 undergraduate sub-
jects (111 women, seventy-five men), in groups ranging in size
from three to ten. We instructed the subjects to watch the trial
as if they were jurors and told them that we would ask for
their verdict and other judgments after the trial. We first
asked participants to reach a verdict on the charge of theft as
outlined by the judge, and to indicate their confidence in that
verdict. Participants next evaluated each witness on several
characteristics: ability, influence, importance, and reliability.
In addition, participants rated the effectiveness of the two at-
torneys, the strength of their respective cases, the influence of
the judicial instructions, and the influence of the defendant's
lack of testimony in his own defense. Next, participants com-
pleted a free response sheet that asked them to describe and
rank the three "most important pieces of evidence that you per-
sonally used in arriving at your verdict decision." Participants
then described and ranked the evidence that would support the
verdict they did not choose. For example, if a participant found
the defendant guilty, we asked the participant to list the three
most important pieces of evidence leading to a guilty verdict
and then to list the three most important pieces of evidence
that would support a verdict of not guilty. The participants
then completed a multiple choice quiz covering the evidence
presented as well as information contained in the judge's in-
structions. We included this as a check on the participants' at-
tention to the trial tape. Finally, participants rated their
satisfaction with the videotaped trial and provided their per-
sonal opinions regarding hearsay admissibility. A final, open-
ended question asked whether they believed jurors serving in
actual trials could properly evaluate hearsay evidence.
The eyewitness selected for this videotaped trial provided
an accurate account of the events of the theft, but her descrip-
[Vol. 76:683
HeinOnline -- 76 Minn. L. Rev. 690 1991-1992
JUROR DECISIONS
tion of the thief was not especially good. On the other hand,
the hearsay witness, whom we had paired with this eyewitness
during the mock police questioning, reproduced the eyewit-
ness's account of the theft and her description of the thief very
accurately. The actual evidence provided by these two wit-
nesses was therefore the same. To maximize experimental con-
trol, we should have had the same person play the role of the
eyewitness and the hearsay witness. However, we desired a
more naturalistic design that would provide us with actual tes-
timony based on a real, albeit staged, event. This meant we had
to use different people in the roles of eyewitness and hearsay
witness. To ensure that only the form of the testimony,
whether eyewitness or hearsay, created any differences in juror
perception and not factors associated with these witnesses, we
had an independent sample of undergraduate subjects watch
the videotapes and rate the witness on 15 dimensions related to
credibility and persuasiveness. An overall MANOVA on these
15 dimensions indicated there was no significant difference in
the perceptions of the two witnesses. Thus, an independent
sample of raters saw the witness as equally convincing, trust-
worthy, confident, and effective. The two witnesses were per-
ceived as providing the same evidence.
A. JURORS VALUED EYEWrrNESS TESTimONY OVER HEARSAY
TESTIMONY
The results from our study indicate that mock juror sub-
jects clearly distinguished between the testimony provided by
the eyewitness and the hearsay witness and, as expected,
weighed the eyewitness testimony more heavily in their verdict
decisions. As shown in Table 1,2 sixty-two percent of the sub-
jects who observed the eyewitness found the defendant guilty,
24.
Table 1
Percentage Verdicts as a Function of Experimental
Condition*
Verdict
Guly Not Guilty
(%) (%)
Circumstantial (n=42) 35.7 64.3
Hearsay (n=50) 40.0 60.0
Eyewitness (n=47) 61.7 38.3
All Evidence (n=47) 55.3 44.7
* N=186. Chi-square = 8.35, p = .04.
1992]
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while only forty percent of the subjects observing the hearsay
testimony voted to convict the defendant.2 The hearsay testi-
mony conviction rate was a meager four percent higher than
the thirty-six percent guilty rate from subjects observing the
circumstantial evidence alone. Also, adding the hearsay testi-
mony to the eyewitness testimony had no impact on the verdict.
In fact, the percentage of guilty verdicts (fifty-five percent)
from subjects who observed all evidence was lower, although
not significantly, than the percentage of guilty verdicts from
subjects who observed only the eyewitness testimony. The
overall verdict pattern, which was significant, 26 demonstrates
that our mock juror verdicts were not influenced by the hear-
say testimony.
In addition to the differences in verdicts, we examined our
subjects' perceptions of the eyewitness and hearsay witness tes-
timony. We found that their perceptions of these two forms of
testimony differed on a number of dimensions. The subjects
rated the testimony of the eyewitness as significantly more in-
fluential in the verdicts than the testimony of the hearsay wit-
ness.27 The subjects also perceived the eyewitness as a more
important 28 and more reliable witness.29 These findings are
consistent with the pattern of verdicts. Our mock juror sub-
jects reported that the hearsay evidence was less important and
influential than the eyewitness testimony, just as significantly
fewer subjects exposed to hearsay evidence found the defend-
ant guilty than did subjects exposed to the eyewitness
testimony.3 0
B. How THE JURORS REACHED THEIR DECISIONS
Our interest then turned to exploring how our subjects
made their decisions and upon what information they based
these decisions. To provide some indirect evidence on how the
subjects made their decisions, we had subjects complete open-
25. Test of proportions z= 2.05, p < .05.
26. X 2(3) = 8.35, p < .05.
27. t(95)= 2.46, p = .01.
28. t(94) = 3.46, p < .01.
29. t(95) = 2.26, p = .03.
30. Jurors in the hearsay condition were also significantly less satisfied
with the amount of evidence presented compared with jurors in the all evi-
dence condition (but not compared to the eyewitness condition). Hearsay ju-
rors also found the evidence quality to be significantly lower than did jurors in
both the eyewitness and the all evidence conditions. There were no significant
differences between any of the conditions on the perceived realism or the in-
terest level in viewing the videotaped trials.
[Vol. 76:683
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ended questions that asked them to name and rank the three
pieces of evidence they found most supportive of their verdict,
whether that decision was guilty or not guilty. To analyze this
free response data, we developed a coding scheme containing
ten categories of evidence. These included testimony by the
four witnesses, the description of the defendant, the fact that
the stolen computer was found in the defendant's apartment,
and, for those jurors in the circumstantial and hearsay groups,
the fact that no eyewitness testified. Two independent raters
classified each statement in one of the ten evidence categories
or an additional miscellaneous category. The raters' classifica-
tions agreed for eighty-six percent of the statements, and one of
the authors resolved discrepancies through discussion with the
raters.
In addition, we had our subjects name and rank the three
pieces of evidence that raised the greatest doubts about their
decisions. For example, if a subject found the defendant guilty,
we asked the subject first to list the three most important rea-
sons why he or she believed the defendant to be guilty. After
providing this information, we asked the subject to list the
three most important pieces of evidence that suggested the de-
fendant was not guilty.
An examination of these open-ended responses yielded
some insights into our mock jurors' decision process. We ex-
pected to find results suggesting that our subjects used the evi-
dence provided by the hearsay testimony, but then engaged in
some type of discounting of the evidence because they consid-
ered hearsay less reliable than eyewitness testimony. Instead
of finding evidence of this type of explicit discounting of the
hearsay evidence, we found that our subjects simply did not re-
port using the hearsay in their decision-making process.
Specifically, those participants voting guilty determined the
most important evidence was the landlord's testimony that he
found the stolen computer in the defendant's apartment. Sixty
individuals (sixty-seven percent) mentioned this testimony as
the single most important item of evidence. As shown in Table
1992]
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2,31 all four groups found this evidence significant, no matter
which evidence they had observed. The subjects exposed to
eyewitness testimony determined that the eyewitness's state-
ment was the second most important evidence and twenty-one
percent listed this as the most important piece of evidence. Fif-
teen percent of the subjects voting guilty who heard the hear-
say evidence listed the testimony of the hearsay witness as
most important.
When asked to indicate what evidence suggested the de-
fendant was not guilty, the groups differed strikingly. Thirty-
seven (sixty-seven percent) of the mock jurors who voted guilty
in the groups receiving eyewitness testimony said the poor de-
scription of the defendant was the most important evidence
supporting a verdict of not guilty. In contrast, only one person
(five percent) voting guilty in the hearsay group reported hav-
ing doubts about the description of the defendant. What cre-
ated doubt in the minds of the mock jurors receiving the
hearsay testimony? Fifteen (seventy-five percent) of the hear-
say jurors who voted for conviction said they were most con-
cerned that no eyewitness account of theft had been presented
or that they had heard "only hearsay" testimony.
Similarly, of those jurors voting not guilty in the hearsay
group, sixteen (fifty-three percent) listed the lack of an eyewit-
ness as the primary reason for their decision to acquit. The cir-
cumstantial evidence only group mirrored this finding; fifty-six
percent cited this reason. The eighteen jurors voting not guilty
in the eyewitness group did not mention a single common item
of evidence as supporting their vote of not guilty, although they
31.
Table 2
Evidence Used in Verdict Decisions
I. Percent of Subjects Citing Evidence in Support of Guilty Verdict*
All
Circumstantial Eyewdtness Hesa Edence
1. Computers found in defendant's
apartment 80% 59% 65% 69%
2. Witness's testimony - 21% 15% 4%
3. Positive identification 
- 7% 20% 15%
II. Percent of Subjects Citing Evidence Against Guilty Verdict
1. Questionable description of
defendant - 55% 5% 81%
2. Lack of eyewitness testimony 27% - 75% -
* All data taken from subjects voting guilty.
[Vol. 76:683
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listed the poor description of the defendant more frequently
(twenty-two percent) than any other piece of evidence. The
mock jurors who received all the evidence also reported being
most influenced by the poor description: fifty-seven percent of
those subjects reported that this was the most important reason
for their decision to vote not guilty. The jurors acquitting the
defendant cited the evidence that the stolen computer was
found in the defendant's apartment as being most supportive of
a guilty verdict. Sixty-three percent of all subjects voting not
guilty listed this response, and these individuals were evenly
distributed across the four groups.
In summary, those subjects who heard the eyewitness testi-
mony and those who heard all the evidence, including the eye-
witness and hearsay testimony, reported that they used the
eyewitness testimony in their verdicts. Subjects in the hearsay
group, on the other hand, reported using evidence from the two
other witnesses (the law professor and the landlord) while only
rarely mentioning the evidence contained in the testimony of
the hearsay witness. Thus, the eyewitness testimony appears
more influential with our mock jurors. Sometimes they used
this evidence to support the verdict, other times they reported
it as raising doubts about the verdict; nevertheless, the eyewit-
ness testimony received a great deal of attention in the open-
ended responses. More importantly, the subjects rarely men-
tioned the hearsay testimony in these open-ended responses.
Instead of relying upon and subsequently discounting the hear-
say evidence, it seems that they either simply ignored or, for
whatever reason, did not report the hearsay testimony.
C. WHY THE JURoRs DiD NOT USE HEARSAY
The data did not distinguish whether our subjects did not
use hearsay because they believe it is unreliable, or because
they heeded the judge's cautionary instructions to discount
hearsay evidence. We found evidence on both sides.
The study suggests that hearsay jurors were following the
judge's instructions. We included a recall quiz to assess how
well our subjects paid attention to the trial tape. One question
presented to all jurors asked for a definition of hearsay. Ninety
percent of the jurors in the hearsay and all evidence groups,
the only groups receiving judicial instructions on hearsay, an-
swered this item correctly compared to fifty-nine percent in the
eyewitness group and thirty-four percent in the control group
(forty-nine percent of the control subjects believed hearsay to
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be evidence of "rumor and gossip"). Another question, admin-
istered only to those jurors receiving hearsay testimony, asked
jurors to identify "one caution given by the judge for evaluating
hearsay evidence." Seventy-six percent of the hearsay jurors
and sixty-four percent of the all evidence jurors were able to
answer this question correctly, while twelve percent of these
jurors incorrectly stated no caution was given. In general, the
jurors correctly recalled an average of 5.3 of the seven judicial
instruction questions and 8.5 of the ten trial fact questions.
Thus, our mock jurors paid attention to the facts of the case
and the judicial instructions, including those involving hearsay,
and apparently understood them. The latter finding contro-
verts studies on inadmissible evidence showing that jurors are
not influenced by judges' cautionary instructions.32 In our case,
one might also argue that jurors discounted the hearsay when
they first heard the witness, and therefore felt validated by the
judge's instructions at the end of the trial. They did not com-
mit to memory anything that later proved damaging to the ef-
fectiveness of the judicial instructions.
Table 3 presents evidence supporting the claim that jurors
believe hearsay to be unreliable independent of judicial instruc-
32. Michele Cox & Sarah Tanford, Effects of Evidence and Instructions in
Civil Trials: An Experimental Investigation of Rules of Admissibility, 4 SOC.
BEHAV. 31, 51-53 (1989); see Tanford, supra note 16, at 72, 79-87; J. Alexander
Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions Following
Empirical Research on Jury Instructions, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 155, 157
(1991); Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence
and Limiting Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAw
& HUM. BEHAV. 477, 479, 480, 494 (1988); Sarah Tanford et al., Decision Mak-
ing in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence of Charge Similarity, Evidence
Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 319, 333-35
(1985); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Ineffzcacy of Limiting
Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt,
9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 46-47 (1985).
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tions.33 We asked our participants for their opinions about
hearsay and the data reflects a rather negative view regarding
the reliability of hearsay. One question described the hearsay
evidence without labelling it as "hearsay." We asked subjects
who received the hearsay testimony how useful this evidence
was in their own verdict decisions. We asked subjects in the
circumstantial and eyewitness groups how useful this evidence
would have been. As the table data suggests,34 jurors who actu-
ally received this testimony rated it as significantly less useful
than the jurors rating its potential usefulness.
We then described and provided an example of hearsay and
asked subjects whether they believed that hearsay should be
admissible evidence. Subjects tended to agree that hearsay
should not be presented to a jury as evidence. Subjects also
agreed that "making hearsay evidence admissible would en-
courage some lawyers or litigants to lie or create evidence by
getting witnesses to testify to statements that were never
made." Subjects also agreed with the statements that hearsay
is not useful because of difficulties in determining the declar-
ant's credibility and because the witness may not remember or
may misstate what the declarant said. Finally, subjects re-
sponded to an open-ended question asking whether they be-
lieved most people serving on a jury would be able to evaluate
33.
Table 3
Opinions of Hearsay Evidence*
All
Measure Circumstantial E Hearsay Evdence
(n=41) (n=47) (n=50) (n=46)
Usefulness 5.78 5.47 4.00 3.59
Inadmissible 3.68 3.47 3.62 4.11
Jury decide 3.71 3.74 4.28 4.35
Lies 3.24 2.77 3.32 3.30
Credibility 2.68 3.02 2.40 3.24
Memory 2.51 2.70 2.86 2.85
* Lower means indicate a stronger concern about the reliability of hearsay
evidence; possible values range from one to seven. Exact item wording found
in Appendix.
34. See Table 3, suprm note 33.
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hearsay evidence properly. As shown in Table 4,35 the majority
of participants believed that jurors could not properly evaluate
hearsay, although many believed that they personally could do
SO.
The opinion data indicates, then, that participants believe
hearsay to be potentially unreliable and difficult to evaluate.
Our study shows that subjects perceived hearsay negatively,
even though jurors in two groups heard judicial instructions on
hearsay while jurors in the other two did not. This finding is
consistent with our interpretation that jurors discount the reli-
ability of hearsay on their own, and not because of the judge's
limiting instructions.
Nevertheless, further research should focus on distinguish-
ing these two interpretations more conclusively. Such data not
only would enhance our understanding of how jurors think
about hearsay evidence, but it also would address perhaps the
central issue for jury researchers-juror and jury competence.
For social science truly to contribute to the debate about hear-
say reform, additional studies that address these empirical
questions will be essential.
CONCLUSION
A principal reason for excluding hearsay is the belief that
it will mislead the jury. Proponents of this position regard
hearsay as inferior evidence because the out-of-court declarant
has not testified under oath and is not subject to observation
and cross-examination. They believe that the absence of these
courtroom safeguards deprives the jury of the means of assess-
ing the credibility of the declarant.36 In addition, some jurists
35.
Table 4
Juror Evaluation of Hearsay: Open-Ended Item*
Yes No Uncertain
Circumstantial 29% 55% 16%
Eyewitness 30% 63% 7%
Hearsay 28% 56% 16%
All Evidence 40% 47% 13%
Marginals 32% 55% 13%
* Question asked was: "Do you think most people serving on a jury would
be able to properly evaluate hearsay evidence? Please briefly give us your
opinion."
36. See Park, supra note 6, at 55-58.
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have pointed out that the admission of hearsay raises dangers
of fabrication by the in-court witness, and of unfair surprise.
Many commentators have suggested that courts or legisla-
tures should reform the hearsay rule to allow hearsay to be re-
ceived more freely, trusting the jury to give it appropriate
value. Radical reform would require both statutory change and,
in criminal cases, a change in the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
Radical reform is not likely to occur in the near future,
although less drastic change that ameliorates the impact of the
hearsay rule has often been proposed and sometimes adopted.
The study discussed in this Article constructed the trial
stimulus to allow some participants to consider evidence that
under current law would be excluded on hearsay grounds. We
believe that the study of the jury's treatment of inadmissible
hearsay is more relevant to law reform concerns than the jury's
treatment of admissible hearsay. In terms of the question of
hearsay admissibility, the data from this study suggests that
hearsay as a form of testimony is not overvalued by jurors, as
some legal scholars have argued. The addition of hearsay evi-
dence to the circumstantial evidence in our demonstration
raised the conviction rate just four percent, and the addition of
hearsay evidence to the eyewitness testimony actually lowered
the conviction rate about seven percent.
The fact that subjects in this study did not give much
weight to hearsay evidence does not conclusively make the case
for hearsay reform. First, further research is needed to deter-
mine whether hearsay evidence has a stronger influence on
jury decision-making under conditions other than those studied
in this experiment. One might hypothesize, for example, that
hearsay might be given greater weight when it takes the form
of a written report by a police officer about an incident wit-
37. See id. at 88-94. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. CONST. amend
VI. The language of the Amendment does not provide clear guidance about
hearsay issues. Park, supra note 6, at 88. It has been interpreted to place lim-
its upon the reception of unreliable hearsay that does not fall under a firmly
rooted exception to the hearsay rule. Id However, the text of the Clause
could easily be interpreted merely to require that the defendant be confronted
with whatever witnesses the prosecution chooses to produce at trial. Id at 88-
89. Under this interpretation, trial witnesses could testify about hearsay decla-
rations, and the Confrontation Clause would impose no limits upon the crea-
tion of new hearsay exceptions. Id. It would merely require the presence of
the defendant when evidence was presented to the trier of fact. I&i
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nessed by the officer. Second, the policy implications of a find-
ing that jurors give little weight to hearsay are not completely
clear. If jurors give hearsay little weight, then a rule excluding
it does not cause great injustice, since admitting it would rarely
have an effect on verdicts. On the other hand, if jurors do disre-
gard hearsay, then the maintenance of an elaborate body of
doctrine excluding it is wasteful. Moreover, at the very least,
this study has significant policy implications for cases in which
an appellate court must decide whether the reception of hear-
say in violation of existing rules constituted reversible error. If
jurors in fact give little or no credence to hearsay evidence,
then the admission of hearsay in violation of the current rules
should be treated as harmless error by appellate courts.
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APPENDIX
ITEMS USED TO ASSESS OPINIONS ABOUT HEARSAY
1. Evidence related to the identification of the defendant
was presented in the trial you just saw. Part of this evidence
was testimony by a witness who was present during police ques-
tioning of someone else who saw the computer thief and who
described the thief and picked an identification photo from the
police officer's photo display.
As a juror in this case, to what extent was this evidence
useful in reaching your verdict? (1=not at all useful, 7=ex-
tremely useful).
Hearsay evidence is "second hand" information of a certain
type. Legally, it is defined as in-court testimony about an out-
of-court statement, when the testimony is offered to show the
truth of some assertion in the out-of-court statement.
For example, Joe tells me that the blue car ran a red light
and crashed into a school bus. If I am a witness in court and
say that Joe told me that the blue car ran the red light and
crashed into the school bus, I am offering hearsay testimony.
Please give your opinion in the statements below. Some
legal experts believe that hearsay is unreliable evidence and
should not be presented to juries. Other legal experts believe
that the jury should be allowed to decide whether the hearsay
is unreliable or not. As a potential juror (anyone over the age
of 18 can be called to serve on a jury), what is your opinion of
the two options given below?
2. Hearsay should not be presented to the jury as evi-
dence. (1=strongly agree, 7=strongly disagree).
3. Hearsay should be presented and the jury can then de-
cide how to use it when making their decision. (1=strongly
agree, 7=strongly disagree).
4. Making hearsay evidence admissible would encourage
some lawyers or litigants to lie or create evidence by getting
witnesses to testify to statements that were never made.
5. Hearsay testimony is not useful because the credibility
of the person who originally makes the statement out of court
is not known (this person is not a witness, so s/he cannot be
cross-examined).
6. Hearsay testimony is not useful because the witness in
court may not remember or may misstate what the original
speaker actually said out of court.
1992]
HeinOnline -- 76 Minn. L. Rev. 701 1991-1992
HeinOnline -- 76 Minn. L. Rev. 702 1991-1992
